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In recent years China has made progress in reducing the imbalances 
in its economy. The readjustment has been significant (see Charts 1 
and 2) as regards both expenditure (with a decline in the weight of 
investment, from accounting for 48% of GDP growth in 2011 to 
35% in 2017, in favour of consumption) and branches of activity 
(with an increase in the weight of the services sector of more than 
10 pp during that period, to 60% of GDP growth, at the expense of 
industry). China has also adopted a set of policies since 2016 to 
reduce its high level of debt. These measures, particularly those 
relating to shadow banking, have reduced aggregate credit growth 
and stabilised debt, mainly that acquired by non-financial 
corporations, as a percentage of GDP (see Charts 3 and 4). 
However, this process is facing a series of difficulties in recent 
months, with economic activity performing less favourably both 
for internal reasons (partly owing to the deleveraging process 
itself) and for external ones (mounting trade tensions with the 
United States). Against this background, the Chinese authorities 
seem to be opting for ensuring growth at short term, even at the 
expense of slowing down the correction of imbalances. This box 
describes the policy measures adopted recently and analyses 
their implications for the process of rebalancing China’s economy.
The first clear sign of the new expansionary economic stance 
arose on the monetary front. At end-June, the People’s Bank of 
China (PBoC) reduced the reserve ratio by 50 bp. It also adopted 
a more expansionary tone in press releases relating to liquidity 
management. As a result of these two measures, the interbank 
rate declined to around 2.8%. Other regulatory changes relating to 
financial institutions (with less restrictive guidelines on the 
management of financial assets and products) and the lending 
policy were also agreed, including: i) laxer collateral eligibility 
criteria for loan facilities in monetary policy transactions; ii) 
adjustment of macroprudential assessment parameters to 
encourage lending; and iii) greater incentives for the granting of 
loans to SMEs and to local government financing vehicles.
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SOURCE: CEIC. Latest observation: 2018 Q2.
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As regards the fiscal policy, at end-July the State Council revealed 
plans to cut taxes to firms (in part through the deduction on R&D 
expenses). This amounts to 0.1% of annual GDP and is additional to 
the decrease in taxes and levies for an amount equivalent to 1.3% of 
GDP (announced in March), including most notably a decrease in 
income tax amounting to 0.4% of GDP. Also until June 2018 China 
had issued only 30% of the annual quota for local government 
special bonds and had incurred only 30% of the fiscal deficit target, 
which suggests that there is ample margin for a proactive fiscal 
policy in the future. In this connection, the State Council also advised 
local governments to speed up the issuance of special bonds 
(amounting to 1.6% of GDP) and encouraged financial institutions to 
cover the funding needs of local government financing vehicles 
aiming to finance infrastructure investment spending.
Finally, the recent depreciation of the renminbi has ambiguous 
effects on economic activity. On the one hand, it may favour 
exports; but, on the other it may have adverse effects on investor 
confidence, generating capital outflows. In fact, since mid-June, 
the PBoC appeared not to be intervening in the foreign exchange 
markets and, accordingly, depreciation was driven by the market, 
owing to divergences in growth expectations between the United 
States and China, the reduction in interest rate spreads and the 
escalating trade tensions between the two countries. However, in 
August the Chinese monetary authority apparently commenced to 
intervene in favour of the renminbi to anchor exchange rate 
expectations, reintroducing the so-called “counter-cyclical factor”1 
and raising the reserve requirement from 0% to 20% for foreign 
exchange transactions.
All of these measures, which were designed to stabilise growth in 
the near term, contribute to partially halt the process of reducing 
imbalances in the economy, which could increase the risks to 
growth in the medium and long term. Also, foreign exchange 
market intervention and capital flow controls could hamper the 
internationalisation of the renminbi and the full opening of the 
capital account. Nonetheless, it can be stated that their impact 
on the imbalances is, to date, very limited, although there is still 
no hard evidence that it has been possible to halt the deceleration 
of activity.
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1  The “counter-cyclical factor”, which aims to moderate short/medium-
term fluctuations in the renminbi’s exchange rate, was introduced by the 
PBoC in May 2017.
